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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: TIlE
SEVERABILITY DOCTRINE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA-
Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469
(9th Cir. 1991).
I. FACTS
Standard Fruit Company (SFC)l began operating its business of
production and purchase of bananas in western Nicaragua in 1970.2
From 1970 to October 1982, SFC, the largest banana importer in
the United States,3 operated by entering into limited partnership
agreements with sixteen different banana plantation owners in the
Chinandega Province of Nicaragua. SFC had exclusive fruit purchase
agreements with each partnership, under which each partnership
promised to sell all export-quality bananas from its plantations to
SFC.4
SFC's operations became jeopardized in 1979 when the Sandinistas
overthrew the Somoza government in Nicaragua, forming a new
"Government of National Reconstruction." 5 The Sandinistas legalized
unions and nationalized the banana export trade, placing it in the
hands of the state-run company, Embanic.6 The Sandinistas planned
I Standard Fruit Company [hereinafter SFC] is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Standard Fruit & Steamship Company [hereinafter Steamship] which in turn is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Hawaii-based Castle & Cooke, Inc. [hereinafter C &
C]. Steamship purchases bananas from SFC and distributes them in the United
States. Republic of Nicar. v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 471-472 (9th Cir.
1991). The bananas are marketed in the United States under the Dole label. Raymond
Bonner, New Nicaraguan Banana War, N.Y. Timss, Nov. 18, 1982, at Dl.
I Stephen Kinzer, U.S. Agency to Decide a Claim on Nicaragua, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 1986, at A4.
SFC bought about $24 million dollars worth of bananas from Nicaragua
annually, which is about one third the number of bananas it places in western United
States markets. Ward Sinclair, Slip in the Banana Trade, WASH. PosT, Jan. 31,
1981, at Al.
" SFC held a 20% equity interest in the partnerships and the plantation owners
held an 80% equity interest in the partnerships. SFC leased the plantations from
their owners and assigned the leases to the partnerships. Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d
at 472.
,Id.
6 Tim Coone, Setting Out to Build a Republic on Bananas, FIN. TimEs, May 8,
1991, § I, at 32. After the Sandinista takeover, production at SFC's farms fell by
nearly half. Kinzer, supra note 2, at A4.
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to transfer SFC's shares in the partnerships to the new Nicaraguan
government. 7
On December 20, 1980, Nicaragua issued "Decree No. 608," out-
lining its plan to take over the production and marketing of all
Nicaraguan bananas.8 To effectuate the monopolization of the banana
trade, the decree provided that all plantation leases would be trans-
ferred to a new government agency, and all pre-existing lease, part-
nership, and fruit purchase contracts were nullified. SFC interpreted
the decree as an expropriation of its business. 9 SFC immediately
ceased all operations in Nicaragua, leaving ripe bananas hanging on
the trees.' 0
Recognizing that the situation had reached crisis proportions," the
Nicaraguan government requested a "summit meeting" at which SFC,
its two parent companies, and the Nicaraguan government could work
out their differences. The meeting began on January 9, 1981 in San
Francisco, and ended after three intense days of negotiations with
the signing of a "Memorandum of Intent" on January 11, 1981.12
7 The new government discussed these issues with General Manager James Sou-
sane, SFC's representative in Nicaragua, for over a year. On June 23, 1980, Ni-
caraguan Minister of Foreign Trade Alejandro Martinez Cuenca sent Sousane a
memo outlining a set of basic guiding principles for the new contractual relationship
between Nicaragua and SFC, including the transfer proposal. SFC objected to the
transfer proposal on the grounds that it could not transfer its 20% share without
the consent of its partners. Negotiations continued on this point until December 20,
1980. Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 472.
8 According to the new Nicaraguan government, the takeover was a means of
improving conditions for some 5,000 low-paid, poorly housed banana workers.
Sinclair, supra note 3, at Al.
9 Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 472.
10 Id. at 473.
" The Nicaraguan government recognized the crisis despite bold statements by
Luis Carrion Cruz, the Interior Undersecretary of the new leftist government. Ac-
cording to Cruz, "This (termination) will not affect the national economy. We prefer
to eat the bananas before we allow the imperialists to impose their will upon the
Nicaraguan people." UPI, Dec. 31, 1980 (International Section), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File. Cruz was also quoted as saying, "Even if we have to eat
every last banana, we are not going to allow these imperialists to humiliate the
revolution." Sinclair, supra note 3, at Al.
12 Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 472. The Memorandum was executed by two
officers of C & C, two officers of Steamship, two Nicaraguan Ministers of Trade,
and a member of the ruling junta of Nicaragua. Sousane and other SFC represen-
tatives participated in the negotiations. They did not, however, sign the document
because of the prior exclusive contracts with the banana plantations. They claimed
they were not able to commit to the Memorandum until resolving their prior
partnership commitments or obtaining the consent of their partners. Id. at 472 n.3.
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The Memorandum, termed an "agreement in principle," provided
for the renegotiation and replacement of four operating contracts 3
between SFC and "the competent Nicaraguan national entity.' 1 4 The
Memorandum established the essential elements of the fruit purchase
contract 5 and rescinded Decree No. 608 for five years. Additionally,
the Memorandum contained an arbitration provision. 16
Within a week after the signing of the Memorandum, SFC returned
to Nicaragua. SFC resumed operations and began negotiating with
Nicaraguan officials regarding the four contracts envisioned in the
Memorandum. 7 Although many subsequent drafts of these four doc-
uments were exchanged, none was ever finalized. Both Nicaragua and
SFC complied with the terms of the Memorandum as though it were
binding throughout the ongoing negotiations and for the duration of
the next twenty-two months." On October 25, 1982, SFC left Ni-
caragua permanently.19
11 The terms of these future contracts were to include a detailed fruit purchase
contract, a technical assistance contract, the transfer of SFC's shares in the plantation
partnerships, and Nicaragua's purchase of SFC's assets in Nicaragua. Id. at 472-
73. Nicaragua took ownership of SFC's land and offices in Nicaragua. Nicaragua
agreed to use SFC to distribute its bananas, and SFC promised to train Nicaraguans
in the business. Kinzer, supra note 2, at A4.
14 The government had set up an entity called "BANANIC" to work with SFC
and the partnerships. In mid-1981, a new government agency, called the Programa
Bananero de Occidente or EMBANOC, was created. EMBANOC dealt with SFC
until its final departure from Nicaragua in October 1982. Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d
at 472 n.4.
11 The price of the bananas was set at $4.30 per box, less specified deductions.
The length of the contract was set at five years although no dates were specified.
Id. at 473.
16 The arbitration clause provided that:
any and all disputes arising under the arrangements contemplated hereunder
... will be referred to mutually agreed mechanisms or procedures of
international arbitration, such as the rules of the London Arbitration As-
sociation.
Id. at 473. Nicaragua admitted during the district court proceeding that the clause
refers to an association which does not exist. However, Nicaragua introduced a
letter into evidence written by Robert Moore, C & C's Vice-President and General
Counsel, and also principal draftsman of the Memorandum. The letter appeared to
suggest that C & C intended the clause to be binding and that the parties intentionally
left it vague because they could not remember the name of the London arbitration
agency. Id. Additionally, Mr. Moore had attached to his letter, "a very explicit
page-long 'substitute arbitration clause' providing for arbitration in London pursuant
to the Arbitration Act of Great Britain." Id. at 473 n.5. The Ninth Circuit noted
that the District Court had disregarded this evidence. Id. at 473.
11 The four contracts provided for technical assistance, fruit purchase, share
transfers, and asset buy-outs. Id.
18 For instance, SFC bought over $30 million worth of bananas at the Memo-
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It was not until nearly four years later that Nicaragua filed a $35
million breach of contract action against SFC in the Northern District
of California on October 21, 1986.20 The District Court ruled that
the Nicaraguan government had no formal contract with SFC and
denied Nicaragua's motion to compel arbitration in accordance with
the arbitration clause contained in the Memorandum of Intent. After
applying a three-part test for arbitrability, 2' the district court held
that the Memorandum as a whole was not a binding contract, thus
rendering the arbitration clause unenforceable. According to the court,
the arbitration clause was not a present agreement to arbitrate, but
merely "a provision declaring the expectations of the parties that
contracts to be negotiated later would include agreements to arbi-
trate. "22
randum's price of $4.30 instead of the $1.26 it had been paying prior to the
Memorandum. Nicaragua, in turn, began allowing the $.75 deduction for asset buy-
back, debt reduction, and technical assistance contemplated by the Memorandum,
for a total rebate of over $3.5 million over the two years. Id.
19 Nicaragua and SFC have given conflicting explanations for SFC's permanent
departure in 1982. The Nicaraguans charged that SFC's decision to pull out of
Nicaragua was "part of an effort by the Reagan Administration to destabilize the
Sandinista Government." C & C denied the accusation, pointing to financial reasons
for its withdrawal. Kinzer, supra note 2, at A4. The motivating economic factor
was based on the price of bananas, which had fallen below production costs because
of oversupply. SFC claimed that its loss of $65 million in 1982 prompted its cessation
of operations in Nicaragua. Tim Comme, Standard Fruit Pulls Out of Nicaragua,
FIN. Tnvrns, Oct. 29, 1982, § II, at 24. SFC also later claimed de facto expropriation
as the reason for its withdrawal from Nicaragua, and filed a claim with the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) for indemnification. In the subsequent OPIC
investigation, Sandinista Agricultural Minister Jaime Wheelock Roman changed his
story. Roman attempted to refute this claim by citing purely economic motivations
for SFC's withdrawal. Kinzer, supra note 2, at A4.
0 The $35.5 million suit alleges that SFC and C & C reneged on a 1980 agreement
to buy all of Nicaragua's banana output for 5 years. Nicaragua sought damages of
$28.5 million for bananas that SFC would have bought during the three remaining
years of its contract, $1.1 million for bananas allegedly shipped but not paid for,
and an additional $5.9 million in unspecified damages. SFC argued that its operations
were expropriated, and filed a $3 million claim with OPIC. Peter Ford, Nicaragua
Sues Standard Fruit for Dollars 35M Over Banana Deal, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1986,
§ I, at 40. The suit also alleges that the banana workers were treated harshly by
SFC. Nicaragua Suit Says U.S. Reneged on Banana Contract, UPI, Oct. 22, 1986
(Domestic News Section), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
21 "First, whether the parties entered into a contract; second, that the contract
included an agreement to arbitrate disputes; and third, that the disputes covered by
the arbitration agreement included those which are before the court." Standard
Fruit, 937 F.2d at 474.
2 Id. The attorney for Nicaragua expressed concern over what he termed "trou-
bling and unorthodox" behavior by U.S. District Judge John P. Vukasin in ques-
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On appeal, held, reversed and remanded. 23 After making a prelim-
inary determination that a contractual relationship exists between the
parties, and that the contract contains a valid arbitration provision
governing the dispute in issue, a court must refer all other disputes
to arbitration. Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9th
Cir. 1991).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The expansion of the global economy has escalated the importance
of arbitration as a viable alternative to judicial resolution of inter-
national commercial disputes. Accordingly, arbitration clauses 24 have
become an integral part of international contracts because of the
speed, flexibility, economy, and neutrality associated with arbitra-
tion. 2 The use of arbitration dates at least as far back as the Middle
Ages, when arbitration furnished the nearly exclusive means for the
settlement of business disputes between English merchants.26 Subse-
quently, business communities of the trading countries of the West,
including the United States, adopted this ancient practice most ef-
fectively through organized commercial groups. These modern or-
tioning an SFC witness off-the-record about his opinion of a key Nicaraguan witness.
Pamela A. MacLean, UPI, April 15, 1988 (Regional News Section), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
23 Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 481. The district court's decision was reversed so
that the arbitration clause would be enforced as to C & C and Steamship. The
decision was remanded in order for the district court to make a preliminary deter-
mination whether or not a contractual relationship existed between SFC and Ni-
caragua. If there was such a relationship, SFC would be directed to arbitrate with
its two parent companies.
24 An arbitration clause is a contractual provision that represents the parties'
voluntary decision to submit disputes arising from their contract to impartial agencies
or individuals. The parties agree to accept the decision as final and binding. S.
WILLISTON & W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1918, at 3 (3d ed. 1976).
11 See Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 9 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1191, 1194 (1977) (arbitration is inexpensive, informal, quick,
private, and convenient); Steven A. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, A.B.A.
J., Feb. 1985, at 78, 79 (arbitration is faster, less costly, private, and informal as
compared to litigation); Celia R. Taylor, National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil,
Inc.: All Dressed Up and Nowhere to Arbitrate, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142, 1146
(1988) (arbitration perceived as quicker because it allows parties to avoid crowded
court calendars and affords flexibility with predictability of outcome). But see Henry
P. deVries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for
National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REv. 42, 61 (1982) (advantages of speed, economy,
and informality exist in domestic arbitration, but not in international arbitration).
26 Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12
VA. L. REV. 265, 266 (1926).
1992]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
ganizations sanctioned refusals to arbitrate or honor an arbitration
award through disciplinary proceedings or expulsion rather than court
action .27
Despite the business community's appreciation for the virtues of
arbitration, United States courts have historically refused to honor
agreements to arbitrate. 28 United States courts adopted this dubious
precedent from the English common law. 29 English courts had tra-
ditionally refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate on the grounds
that such agreements "ousted" their jurisdiction, rendering such
agreements void as contrary to public policy.30 Events following World
War I slowly but effectively extinguished the ouster view.
World War I was followed by an expansion in world trade, during
which the trading countries of the West enacted various arbitration
statutes."' The Geneva Arbitration Treaties of 192332 and 192733 were
enacted by various countries throughout the world, but they were
not adopted by the United States. 34 Although New York enacted the
first arbitration statute in the United States in 1920, 35 other United
States courts continued to follow the English common law precedent
27 Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-56
(1961); deVries, supra note 25, at 43.
See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985
(2d Cir. 1942) (one factor explaining the English judiciary's hostility towards ar-
bitration was that English judges' salaries came largely from litigation fees); Home
Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 457-58 (1874) (agreements made in advance
of dispute to oust courts of jurisdiction are illegal and void); Mitchell v. Dougherty,
90 F. 639, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1898) (agreements made prior to dispute are unenforceable
as they oust courts of jurisdiction); Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa,
254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958) (agreements in advance of controversy oust
courts of jurisdiction and are void as contrary to public policy).
19 Stephen P. Bedell et. al., Arbitrability: Current Developments in the Inter-
pretation and Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 1
(1987); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 n.4 (1974) (ouster
view adopted by American courts as part of common law up to the time of the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925).
30 deVries, supra note 25, at 50 n.38; see also Mentschikoff, supra note 27, at
856.
1' deVries, supra note 25, at 50-51.
12 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158.
13 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26,
1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302.
11 The Geneva Treaties of 1923 and 1927 have been superseded by the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (signed by the
United States and codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (Supp. 1991)).
1 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (Consol. 1988).
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which was considered too authoritative to be overturned absent a
legislative directive. a6
A. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
The enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) 7 reversed
the trend of judicial hostility towards arbitration, reflecting Congress'
intent to establish a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.38 The
FAA was designed to allow contracting parties to avoid "the costliness
and delays of litigation," and to place arbitration agreements "upon
the same footing as other contracts. . . -39 Accordingly, the FAA
provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements, mandating that
such agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."4
The FAA enforces arbitration agreements in contracts involving mar-
itime transactions and contracts evidencing transactions involving inter-
state or foreign commerce. 4' The FAA enables a party to petition a
United States district court for an order compelling arbitration if another
party refuses to honor an arbitration agreement.4 2 In order to direct the
parties to arbitrate, the court must be satisfied that the arbitration
agreement itself is not in issue.43 The FAA also provides for the ap-
36 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 n.6 (1985) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
37 Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-101, 43 Stat. 883 (current
version codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
38 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490 (1987) (the FAA embodies a clear federal
policy of requiring arbitration); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
(strong federal policy in favor of arbitration requires holding federal securities claims
arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626 (1985) (doubts concerning arbitrability of issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract
language or a defense to arbitrability) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)). See also Comment, Arbitration-
Doctrine of Separability-United States Arbitration Act-Enforcement of Arbitration
Clause Required Although Principal Contract May Be Voidable, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV.
565, 569 (1968) (stating that strong national policy favoring arbitration has been
adopted and should be fully implemented).
19 H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924).
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
,2 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
43 Id. Section 4 provides:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making
of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not
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pointment of arbitrators if none are specified in the agreement,- and
for district court confirmation of an arbitral award. 45 Finally, the FAA
promotes arbitration by requiring courts to stay litigation that is com-
menced in disregard of arbitration agreements. 46 In order to grant a
stay, the court must first be satisfied that the issue involved is encom-
passed within the scope of the arbitration clause.47
Although United States courts were more inclined to uphold ar-
bitration agreements after enactment of the FAA in 1925, it was
years before courts consistently began to enforce arbitration agree-
ments4 A crucial development that tilted the balance in favor of
enforcing arbitration agreements occurred when the United States
finally acceded to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (Convention) in 1970. 49
in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration .... If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure,
neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof.
- 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982).
' 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982). The court entering a judgment on the award will be the
court specified by the parties in their agreement. If no court has been named, the
district court in the district in which the award was given has the authority to
confirm the award.
- 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
41 Id. Section 3 provides in part:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States . . . the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied
that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration
under such an agreement, shall ... stay the trial of the action until such
arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement ....
48 See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821
(2d Cir. 1968) (claim under antitrust laws is a matter of paramount public interest
and inappropriate for arbitration); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (Section 14
of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits arbitration agreements, and federal laws
governing the sale of securities should be governed exclusively by the courts). Cf.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(holding antitrust claim arbitrable); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506
(1974) (holding securities claim arbitrable). See also Cohen & Dayton, supra note
26, at 281 (expressing the prevailing view that some issues are more appropriate for
arbitration than others).
49 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention]. The United
States participated in the 1958 negotiations but did not accede to the Convention
until 1970. The delayed accession was based in part on concern that certain Con-
vention provisions conflicted with domestic law. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N 3601, 3601-02. The decision to ratify
the Convention was a result of increased support of governmental, commercial, and
private groups that favored international arbitration. S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-3 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Session 1-2 (1970).
[Vol. 22:487
NICARAGUA V. STANDARD FRuIT Co.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1970
In 1970, Congress ratified and implemented the Convention by
adding Chapter 2 to the Federal Arbitration Act (the Act).5 0 The
Convention's primary objective was to encourage and facilitate in-
ternational arbitration by recognizing international arbitration agree-
ments and providing uniform standards.5 Chapter 2 of the FAA
mandates that the Convention "shall be enforced in United States
Courts."5 2
Chapter 2 applies to arbitration agreements and awards arising out
of commercial legal relationships, whether contractual or not." The
FAA will not apply if both parties are United States citizens unless
the transaction involves property located abroad or involves at least
one foreign state.5 4 Federal district courts have jurisdiction regardless
of the amount in controversy. Actions may be removed from state
to district courts where the subject matter of the action relates to
an arbitration agreement or award falling under Chapter 2.56 Finally,
Chapter 2 provides for the enforcement of forum selection clauses
under the agreement, the appointment of arbitrators, 7 and entry of
judgment on arbitral awards. 8
The most significant articles of the Convention encompassed in
Chapter 2 are Articles II and V, which provide defenses for parties
seeking to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement or award.
Article II(l) expressly compels the courts of a contracting state to
recognize arbitration agreements, provided that the dispute concerns
a subject matter capable of arbitration. 9 Pursuant to Article 11(3),
"o Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (codified at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 201-208 (1982)).
1' S. ExEc. Doc. No. E., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Jill A. Pietrowski, Enforcing
International Commercial Arbitration Agreements-Post-Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 36 AM. U. L. REv. 57, 64 (1986); Ronald E.M.
Goodman, Arbitrability & Antitrust: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655, 657 (1985).
52 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).
5 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
54 Id.
" 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982).
9 U.S.C. § 205 (1982).
9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982).
5' 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). The Act allows a party to have an arbitration award
falling under the Act confirmed within three years after the award was made unless
an article V defense applies. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982).
19 Convention, supra note 49. Article II subsection 1 provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which
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the court is required to refer the parties to arbitration unless the
court finds the "said agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed."6
Article V provides mechanisms to avoid arbitration awards by listing
grounds under which a court may refuse to recognize an award. 6'
However, Article V expressly allows avoidance of awards only, and
makes no reference to arbitration agreements. Article V(1)(a) permits
refusal to enforce an award if the agreement itself is void either
according to the stipulated law or, in the alternative, according to
the law of the country where the award was made.62 Moreover, Article
V(2)(a) specifically allows a court to refuse enforcement of an ar-
bitration award if it determines that the subject matter of the dispute
is incapable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the country
where enforcement is sought. 63 Article V(2)(b) extends the scope of
award enforcement defenses even further by permitting a court to
refuse to compel arbitration if submitting the issue to arbitration
would be contrary to the public policy of the country where the
enforcement is sought. 64
C. Impact of the 1970 Federal Arbitration Act
The enactment of the 1958 Convention as Chapter 2 of the FAA
in 1970 has led to an even wider acceptance and enforcement of
arbitration agreements and awards. 65 In addition to echoing the only
available defense in Chapter 1,66 Article 11(3) of Chapter 2 expressly
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable
of settlement by arbitration. (emphasis added).
60 Convention, supra note 49, art. 11(3). The subsection further provides in relevant
part: "The court of a Contracting State ... shall at the request of one of the
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is
null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." Id. (emphasis added).
61 Convention, supra note 49, art. V.
61 Convention, supra note 49, art. V(1)(a).
63 Convention, supra note 49, art. V(2)(a).
6 Convention, supra note 49, art. V(2)(b).
63 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
640 (1985) (international arbitration of antitrust claims ordered under FAA); Scherk
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974) (arbitration clause governing
international trademark claim brought under securities law enforced). See generally,
Pietrowski, supra note 51 (noting growing willingness of United States courts to
submit contract disputes to arbitration).
9 U.S.C. § 2 provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable except "upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Compare this with the language of article 11(3) of the Convention, supra note 60.
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provides for a subject matter defense. 67 In the interim between Chapter
I and Chapter 2, the lack of subject matter defenses in Chapter 1
led to judicial creation of those defenses. Thus, despite the FAA's
explicit directive that arbitration agreements shall be enforceable,
courts refused to enforce certain arbitration clauses in order to pre-
serve exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain claims" or to better
implement the policies of other federal statutes.69 Disputes rendered
inarbitrable due to subject matter included antitrust, 70 federal secu-
rities, 7' patent, 72 and bankruptcy.73
Even with the new legislative tolerance evinced by the enactment
of Chapter 2, the courts' allowance of subject matter defenses to
avoid agreements to arbitrate was short-lived. In an attempt to prod
the lower courts in the direction of strict enforcement of arbitration
clauses, the line of recent Supreme Court opinions regarding arbitr-
ability strips the defense of nonarbitrable subject matter of its ef-
fectiveness.7 4 Following the Supreme Court's directive, the Second
67 For language of Convention, art. 11(l), see supra note 59.
68 See, e.g., Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Belke v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693
F.2d 1023 (11th Cir. 1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.
1981) (all refusing to enforce claims covered by arbitration clauses in order to
preserve exclusive federal jurisdiction over related federal securities claims).
69 See, e.g., Applied Digital Technology v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d
116 (7th Cir. 1978); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
432 U.S. 910 (1977); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore, 590 F.2d
823 (10th Cir. 1978); S.A. Mineraco da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 576
F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (all holding arbitration clauses unenforceable in the
areas of antitrust, bankruptcy, lob-5 claims, and RICO respectively).
70 American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968) (determining perceived problems of arbitrator competence, hostility to antitrust
claims, inability to deter future violations, and the public nature of antitrust litigation
renders arbitration inappropriate for antitrust claims).
7 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Smoky Greenhaw Cotton
Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 720 F.2d 1446 (5th Cir. 1982);
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (all exempting Securities
Act of 1933 claims from arbitration).
72 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.
1970) (holding issues concerning the validity of a U.S. patent incapable of deter-
mination through arbitration proceedings); accord Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d
585 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F.Supp.
897 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
11 Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1038 (1984); In re Win. S. Newman Brewing Co., 87 B.R. 236
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988).
74 See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (FAA pre-empts state labor
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Circuit held that international comity concerns75 override the tradi-
tional nonarbitrability of bankruptcy. 76 Similarly, Congress has
amended patent law to provide for arbitration of patent validity and
infringement issues. 77 Finally, although many of the Supreme Court
decisions dealt with international contracts, a broadening of issue
arbitrability in the domestic arena 78 has accompanied the broadening
of issue arbitrability in the international arena. 79
In contracts between the United States and entities of foreign
nations, most subject matter defenses no longer carry any weight,
despite the Convention's allowance of such defenses.8 0 The indisput-
able trend reflects the judicial determination that international con-
law provisions); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (antitrust claim arbitrable irrespective of public policy concerns); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (enforcing an arbitration clause
even though it involved traditionally nonenforceable subject matter of securities
claims); Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (FAA preempts state laws
invalidating arbitration clauses otherwise valid under the FAA); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (upholding liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506 (1974) (holding securities claims arbitrable); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (holding claims of fraud in the inducement
of the contract must be arbitrated when the questioned contract contains an arbi-
tration clause).
71 See infra note 81 for an explanation of international comity.
76 Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975) (emphasizing
the Convention's underlying policy of supporting international arbitration at the
expense of national public policy).
7 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1982); see also Carmichael, The Arbitration of Patent Disputes,
38 ARE. J. 1, 6 (1983) (discussing the new legislation's role in encouraging the
inclusion of arbitration clauses in patent license agreements and contracts).
78 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222 (1985) (requiring
rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements in the domestic context); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984) (acknowledging that the Act creates a
body of federal substantive law applicable in both federal and state courts); Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding
that the Act guarantees federal policy of enforcement of private arbitration agree-
ments).
79 For opinions broadening issue arbitrability in the international contracts, see
infra note 102.
80 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 627 (1985) (international comity concerns mandate arbitration of an international
claim notwithstanding conflicting domestic policy); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506, 515-516 (1974) (international nature of contract involved in securities
laws claim overrode prescriptive domestic policy); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas
Co. v. Societe General de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d
Cir. 1974) (transnational policy concerns underlying arbitration agreement require a
stricter view of nonarbitrability than in the domestic context).
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cerns, such as comity,", override domestic policy. 2 The force behind
this trend is a growing awareness that the growth of international
trade depends upon the ability to ensure the neutrality and predict-
ability that is associated with arbitration, especially in international
disputes .83
Moreover, public policy in favor of international arbitration is
strong.84 Courts distinguish public policy from national policy, con-
struing the public policy limitation in the Convention narrowly 5 by
applying it only where enforcement would violate the forum state's
most basic notions of morality and justice.16 Accordingly, many courts
81 The Supreme Court has defined "comity" as a jurisprudential principle that
seeks to reconcile United States' laws not only with directly conflicting laws of other
foreign nations, but also with the requirements of an "international legal order"
capable of resolving conflicts arising out of international trade. Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985).
The Third Circuit has defined comity as:
a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law,
but one of practice, convenience, and expediency .... [lit is a nation's
expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to inter-
national duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by
its laws.
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
82 See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir.
1979) (noting importance of comity concerns, reciprocity, and judicial limitations
when antitrust dispute involves foreign nations); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976) (emphasizing role of international comity
and fairness in regulating foreign commerce); accord Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone, Corp.,
892 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1990).
'1 See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (noting that
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum contractual provision is an almost indispensable
prerequisite to achievement of orderliness and predictability essential to any inter-
national business transaction); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
11-12 (1972) (observing that although business executives prefer to have disputes
resolved in their own courts, that choice is not usually available, and neutral forum
with expertise in the subject matter is the next best choice); Hanes Corp. v. Millard,
531 F.2d 585, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that arbitration eliminates uncertainty
and unpredictability).
84 See supra note 38 for opinions expressing the emphatic federal policy in favor
of arbitration.
85 The Arbitral Convention provides a public policy defense to enforcement of
arbitral awards. Convention, supra note 49, at art. V(2)(b).
Fotochrome, Inc., v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975) (insisting
that the public policy defense was not intended to "enshrine the vagaries of inter-
national politics under the rubric of 'public policy."') (citing Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969,
974 (1974)).
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have strictly limited the nonarbitrability standards in the international
context to agreements whose performance is illegal or voidable under
internationally recognized contract principles.
87
D. Prima Paint and the Severability Doctrine
In addition to the issues of public policy and subject matter ar-
bitrability, the issue of severability has a significant impact on the
interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements. The sev-
erability doctrine provides that an arbitration clause is an agreement
independent of its container contract. 8 The promise to arbitrate by
both parties is considered sufficient consideration for an arbitration
agreement to be binding and independent. 9
Severability generally hinges upon what potential disputes are en-
compassed within the language of the arbitration clause. 9° If a party
desires that all possible disputes be arbitrated, and that the arbitration
clause be severable, a "broad" arbitration clause should be included
in the contract. 9' If a party merely intends for certain disputes such
Ledee v. Ceramiche Rago, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982) (determining that
the Convention's "null and void" clause applies only to defenses such as fraud,
mistake, duress, and waiver that can be applied neutrally on an international scale);
Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidemar, 417 F. Supp. 207, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 553
F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1977) (concluding that international contracts are subject to ar-
bitration, despite United States public policy against restrictive trade practices and
boycotts, unless obligation or remedy is prohibited by pertinent statute or other
declaration of public policy).
0 Under the severability doctrine, the validity of an arbitration clause and the
validity of its container contract are independent questions. Comment, supra note
38, at 566.
See, e.g., Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th
Cir. 1983). An illustration of the court's reasoning is helpful: "The agreement to
arbitrate and the agreement to buy and sell motors are separate. Sauer's promise
to arbitrate was given in exchange for White's promise to arbitrate and each promise
was sufficient consideration for the other." Id.
The phrase "arising under" is usually considered to be "relatively narrow as
arbitration clauses go." Sinva, Inc., v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
In In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1961), Judge Medina
determined that when an arbitration clause "refers to disputes or controversies 'under'
or 'arising out of' the contract," arbitration is limited to "disputes and controversies
relating to the interpretation of the contract and matters of performance." Judge
Medina's rationale was that the phrase "arising under" is narrower in scope than
the phrase "arising out of or relating to," the standard language recommended by
the American Arbitration Association. Id.
9, A broad arbitration clause allows the court to compel arbitration and permits
the arbitrator to decide whether the dispute is arbitrable. Such clauses are drafted
in broad terms and intended to cover a broad range of disputes. See, e.g., Robert
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as contract terms or performance to be arbitrated, a "narrow" ar-
bitration clause should be included in the contract instead. 92 Therefore,
if a clause is not broad enough to cover the dispute, courts generally
conclude that the parties did not intend it to be arbitrable. 9 The
underlying rationale is that because arbitration is a matter of contract,
a party cannot be required to arbitrate any dispute which he has not
agreed to arbitrate. 94
An encouraging breakthrough for proponents of arbitration came
with the Supreme Court's decision in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Mfg. Co.95 In Prima Paint, the plaintiff claimed that a
consulting agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was
induced by fraud. Despite specific representations of financial strength
by the defendants, the defendants went into bankruptcy a week after
the agreement was signed. 96 The Supreme Court determined that the
issue of fraud was a controversy arising out of the consulting agree-
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404 (2d Cir. 1959) (broad
arbitration clause before the court stating, "[a]ny complaint, controversy, or question
which may arise with respect to this contract that cannot be settled by the parties
thereto, shall be referred to arbitration"); Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
514 F.2d 614, 616 (1st Cir. 1975) (clause read, "[any controversy or claim arising
out of or relating to this agreement"); Altshul Stern & Co., Inc. v. Mitsui Bussan
Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir. 1967) (clause read, "any dispute ... arising
out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof"); Georgia Power Co., v.
Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that pursuant to
an arbitration clause which read "any controversy ... arising under this Agreement,"
no "provision of the contract [was] wholly outside of the arbitration provision"),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976).
92 See, e.g., Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc., v. Ssangyong Construction Co.,
Ltd., 708 F.2d 1458, 1463 (9th Cir. 1983) (determining that the phrase "arising
hereunder" meant "arising under the contract itself" and "matters or claims in-
dependent of the contract or collateral" to the contract were not included in the
scope of the clause). Some clauses are even more specific as to the disputes to be
covered. See Prudential Lines v. Exxon Corp., 704 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1983) (one
clause covered any dispute between owner and charter "in respect to the responsibility
for repairs, renewals or replacements, or as to the condition of the vessel at the
time of redelivery .... ").
93 See Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136,
1139 (9th Cir. 1991); AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475
U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (both citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) and Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,
570-571 (1960) ("[ajrbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required
to submit any dispute which he has not agreed to so submit.")).
- Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-571 (1960).
91 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
1 Id. at 397-98.
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ment, and thus a dispute covered by the agreement's broad arbitration
clause. 97
The Court held that unless the parties clearly intend otherwise,
arbitration clauses are "separable" from the contracts in which they
are embedded. 98 The Court's reasoning turned upon section 4 of the
Act, which mandates that arbitration proceed once a court is satisfied
that the existence of the arbitration clause itself is not in issue. 99
Accordingly, the Court held that issues going to the making of the
arbitration clause itself are for the courts to decide, but disputes as
to fraud in the making of the contract as a whole are for the
arbitrators to decide.'0 Thus, the clear directive of the Court's de-
cision in Prima Paint was that in order to successfully avoid arbitrating
a claim of fraudulent inducement, litigants opposing arbitration must
direct their attacks only against the arbitration clause itself.'0'
Although the language of Prima Paint referred specifically to fraud
in the inducement, several courts have extended this rationale to
encompass contract rescission on grounds such as frustration of pur-
pose, mutual mistake, duress, unconscionability, and coercion.12 Many
" The broad arbitration clause read in part:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in the City of New York,
in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration
Association.
Id. at 398.
98 Id. at 402. The Court relied in part on Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959) for this view. In Lawrence, the Second
Circuit, faced with a factual situation analogous to that in Prima Paint, determined
that the agreement to arbitrate was "separable" from the rest of the contract and
independently enforceable as a matter of substantive law. Therefore, the court
concluded that the issue of fraudulent inducement of the contract's making was an
issue for the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Section 4 provides in relevant part:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making
of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not
in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
,00 Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
101 See Mosely v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167 (1963) (ar-
bitration clause attacked and held to be part of a fraudulent scheme); American
Airlines, Inc. v. Louisville Jefferson County Air Bd., 269 F.2d 811, 817 (6th Cir.
1959) (arbitration agreement invalid because agreeing to arbitrate was an ultra vires
act).
102 See, e.g., Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774
F.2d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1985) (Prima Paint rationale applies to frustration of purpose
and mutual mistake); Hall v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 662 F. Supp. 468, 471
n. 1 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (disputes involving duress, unconscionability, coercion, or
confusion in signing agreement must be arbitrated).
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courts expand upon Prima Paint's holding even further, holding that
issues related to the making of the contract, and thus its validity,
are subject to arbitration unless the arbitration clause itself is at-
tacked. 03
Other courts refuse to interpret Prima Paint so broadly, reading
Prima Paint as limited to challenges seeking to avoid or rescind a
contract. °4 Under this narrower interpretation, challenges to the mak-
ing of the contract are not arbitrable, as proponents of this view
equate the "making" of the contract with the "very existence" of
the contract. 105 Pursuant to this approach, the arbitration clause is
severable when a voidable contract is alleged,1°6 but not when a
contract's validity is challenged.1 7
101 Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[tlhe
teaching of Prima Paint is that a federal court must not remove from the arbitrators
consideration of a substantive challenge to a contract unless there has been an
independent challenge to the making of the arbitration clause itself") (quoting
Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 524, 529 (1st
Cir. 1985)); Rhoades v. Powell, 644 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (the Prima Paint
doctrine extends to all challenges to the making of a contract); see also Robert
Coulson, Prima Paint: An Arbitration Milestone, 22 ARB. J. 237, 241 (1967) (ob-
serving that henceforth, when confronted with an arbitration clause in a contract
falling under the FAA, courts will consider only the validity and coverage of the
agreement).
,04 See, e.g., Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d
1136, 1140 (1991) (Prima Paint is limited to challenges seeking to avoid or rescind
a contract, not to challenges going to the making of a contract); Par-Knit Mills,
Inc., v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1980) (issues related to the
making of the contract are not arbitrable); Pollux Marine Agencies v. Louis Dreyfus
Corp. 455 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (denying arbitration on the ground that
a challenge to the entire contract goes to the making of the arbitration clause).
105 Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1140 (9th Cir. 1991) (challenges to the making of
a contract go to the very existence of a contract). See also Camping Construction
Co. v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers Local 378, 915 F.2d 1333, 1340 (9th Cir.
1990) (it is for the courts to determine whether a contract ever existed); I.S. Joseph
Co. v. Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 400 (8th Cir. 1986) (enforceability of
the arbitration clause is a question for the court when one party denies the existence
of a contract); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 850 F.2d
756, 761 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (there is no authority to order a party to arbitrate if there
was never an agreement to arbitrate); Heinhuis v. Venture Assocs., No. CIV.A.90-
2148, 1991 WL 111011 (E.D.La. 1991) (the preliminary question as to the existence
of a contractual relationship which could make the arbitration agreement enforceable
is a question for the court).
106 Voidable contracts are those "where one party was an infant, or where the
contract was induced by fraud, mistake or duress, or where breach of warranty or
other promise justifies the aggrieved party in putting an end to the contract."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 cmt. b (1981).
,07 Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1140.
19921
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
The reasoning underlying the narrow view echoes Justice Black's
dissent in Prima Paint, in which he expressed concern that the Act
should be interpreted so as not to allow "bootstrapping," arguing
that "if there has never been any valid contract, then there is not
now and has never been anything to arbitrate."' 08 Several commen-
tators also agree with Justice Black, expressing difficulty in under-
standing how an arbitration clause can be valid if the entire contract
containing it is void. 1°9
III. ANALYsIs
Congressional legislation, international commitments, and Supreme
Court rulings express and mandate the strong United States policy
favoring arbitration. Enforcing arbitration agreements benefits the
international business community by allowing swift and efficient dis-
pute resolution in the manner chosen by the parties." 0 Additionally,
the international trade community has long favored arbitration be-
cause of its "simplicity, informality, and expedition.""' The inclusion
of an arbitration clause in an international commercial contract is
now an almost universal practice." 2
Prima Paint was a landmark case in establishing wide acceptance
of the severability doctrine. Standard Fruit has added to the sever-
ability doctrine's effectiveness by clearing up unresolved issues created
by subsequent inconsistent interpretations of Prima Paint. The Ninth
log Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 425 (1967).
119 See, e.g., Herbert M. Lord, Arbitration in the U.S., 9 MAR. LAW 227 (1984)
(finding Justice Black's dissent more persuasive than the majority's holding); Com-
ment, supra note 38, at 567 (arguing that it is difficult to see how if the entire
contract is void, the arbitration clause can nevertheless be valid); see also Daniel
G. Collins, Arbitration and the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 ARB. J. 193, 214
(1966) (stating that the doctrine that an arbitration clause is separable from the rest
of the contract appears to be basically at odds with the UCC's conception of an
integrated transaction).
1,0 Celia R. Taylor, National Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, Inc.: All Dressed
Up and Nowhere to Arbitrate, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1142, 1146-1147 (1988).
- Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
112 Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980 J. Bus. L. 164, 164 (1980).
Despite the wide practice of commercial arbitration in the United States today,
the United States was slow to adopt this practice as compared to other nations.
Chief Justice Burger has observed that there is widespread use of private arbitration
in England and on the Continent. Furthermore, jury trials are virtually nonexistent
in Europe and European business people, lawyers, and judges cannot understand
the failure to use arbitration more widely in the United States. Warren E. Burger,
Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, 40 ARB. J. 3, 5 (1985).
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Circuit has gone further than any other in clearly drawing the line
indicating where the contract's "existence" ends and where its "mak-
ing," or the validity and thus severability, begins. Additionally, Stan-
dard Fruit provides a directive for contracting parties to ensure that
intentions to arbitrate or not to arbitrate are construed by courts
accordingly. Moreover, Standard Fruit applies the severability doctrine
on an international scale, emphasizing international comity and ar-
bitration's invaluable role in the continued growth of international
trade.
A. Cleaning up Prima Paint's Mess
The Ninth Circuit in Standard Fruit held that Prima Paint demands
that arbitration clauses be severable from their container contracts
unless there is a clear intent to the contrary." 3 The Ninth Circuit
determined that section 2 of the FAA expressly requires arbitration
unless the arbitration agreement is not part of a contract evidencing
interstate commerce, or the arbitration agreement is revocable "upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.""14
The court also looked to section 4 of the FAA, noting that section
4 requires a court to order arbitration if it is satisfied that "the
making of the agreement for arbitration .. . is not in issue.""115
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a court "can only de-
termine whether a written arbitration agreement exists, and if it does,
enforce it 'in accordance with its terms."' 6 An arbitration clause
may thus be enforced even though the rest of the contract is later
held invalid by the arbitrator.17
Several recent decisions appear to conflict with Prima Paint, in-
cluding the Ninth Circuit's decision in Three Valleys Mun. Water
District v. E.F. Hutton & Co."" and the district court's decision in
"I Republic of Nicar. v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d at 476.
.. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The purpose of this section is to place arbitration on the
same footing as all contracts. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
"I Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 475 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982)).
116 Id. (quoting Howard Elec. & Mech. v. Briscoe Co., 754 F.2d 847, 849 (9th
Cir. 1985)); accord Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 15 (1983).
17 Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989).
"I Three Valleys Mun. Water Distr. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1139
(9th Cir. 1991). In Judge Holcomb's dissent, she stated that the majority's decision
violated Prima Paint's clear directive that all issues save the arbitration agreement
itself are for the arbitrator, not the courts. Id. at 1145-46.
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Standard Fruit."9 Additionally, in an opinion that came out one
month before Standard Fruit, Heinhuis v. Venture Associates, Inc.
of Louisiana, the Eastern District of Louisiana refused to sever an
arbitration clause from its container contract. 120
In Heinhuis, the issue concerned the existence of a contractual
relationship. The court held that the existence of a contractual re-
lationship was a preliminary question for the courts.' 21 Several other
courts share Heinhuis' reasoning, concluding that if no contractual
relationship exists, there is no agreement to arbitrate. 122 Many of
these decisions, including Three Valleys, limit the nonarbitrability of
a contract's existence by concluding that in order for a contract's
existence to be resolved by the courts, there must be an unequivocal
denial that any agreement between the parties was made. 23
These decisions do not conflict with Prima Paint's reading of section
4 of the FAA 124 that once a court is satisfied that the agreement to
arbitrate is in issue, all other issues must proceed to arbitration. As
in Prima Paint, these courts look to section 4 of the FAA; however,
they hold that a court's preliminary determination as to whether there
119 The district court reasoned that an arbitration clause cannot be valid unless
the contract containing it is valid. Therefore the district court held that it must first
decide whether the contract was valid. In reversing the district court, the Ninth
Circuit held that this reasoning violates Prima Paint. Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at
476 n.9.
The district court relied to some extent on a Southern District of New York
decision which denied arbitration on the ground that a challenge to the entire contract
went to "the making" of the arbitration clause. Pollux Marines Agencies v. Louis
Dreyfus Corp., 455 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Pollux is not
the law in the Ninth Circuit, and that it conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent of
following Prima Paint.
120 Heinhuis, No. CIV.A.90-2148, 1991 WL 111011 (E.D. La. June 10, 1991).
121 Id. at *2; Three Valleys, 925 F.2d at 1140-41.
22 See, e.g., Camping Constr. Co. v. Distr. Council of Iron Workers Local 378,
915 F.2d 1333, 1340 (9th Cir. 1990) (the court must determine whether a contract
ever existed, and unless the court finds that one does, there is no basis for submitting
any question to an arbitrator); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine
Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (if parties never agreed to arbitrate, there
is no authority to require a party to submit to arbitration); I.S. Joseph Co. v.
Michigan Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, at 400 (8th Cir. 1986) (when one party denies
the existence of a contract with the other, the enforceability of an arbitration clause
is an issue for the court).
123 Heinhuis, 1991 WL at *2; T & R Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Grain Co.,
613 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1980).
124 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
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is an arbitration agreement begins with an inquiry as to whether an
agreement exists between the parties in the first place. 25
Standard Fruit effectively reconciled these opinions with Prima
Paint in holding that although section 4 of the FAA requires a court
to order arbitration once it is satisfied that a valid arbitration agree-
ment exists, the contract itself must exist in order for the arbitration
agreement to exist. 26 Thus, Standard Fruit held that the "existence"
of a contractual relationship between the parties is a question for
the court. 27 All other issues, the court concluded, concern the con-
tract's validity and are for the arbitrators to decide. 2s
In determining that the preliminary issue of whether a contractual
relationship existed between SFC and Nicaragua was for the district
court to decide', 29 the Ninth Circuit effectively drew the line between
the making or validity of a contract, which is arbitrable, and a
contract's very existence, which is not. Existence of a contract, the
court concluded, is satisfied when both parties admit to entering into
a contract with one another. 30 The court noted that the "first principle
of arbitration" remains that a party cannot be forced to arbitrate
something which it has never agreed to arbitrate. 3' Accordingly,
125 See, e.g., LS. Joseph Co., 803 F.2d at 399 (the FAA provides that the district
court's preliminary inquiry as to whether there is an arbitration agreement includes
a determination that the parties have made an agreement at all); Heinhuis, 1991
WL at *2-3 (the preliminary question as to a contract's existence which would make
the arbitration agreement enforceable is not a question for arbitration).
126 Republic of Nicar. v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d at 481.
27 Id. at 480.
121 Id. at 476-77.
129 Id. at 480.
130 Id. at 478.
I Id.; accord Three Valleys, 925 F.2d 1136 at 1142 (9th Cir. 1991); AT&T
Technologies v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
In accordance with this "first principle of arbitration," the Ninth Circuit remanded
the issue as to whether a contractual relationship between SFC and Nicaragua existed
back to the district court. The Ninth Circuit held that whether SFC was bound
when its parent companies signed but SFC itself didn't was a question for the district
court. Should the district court decide that SFC was not bound, the parent companies
were to go ahead and arbitrate with Nicaragua without SFC being present. Standard
Fruit, 937 F.2d at 480. See supra note 12 for a discussion concerning SFC's reasons
for not signing the Memorandum at the outset.
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court's finding that there were no facts
on which an inference of agency could be based was erroneous. The court noted
that under California law, ostensible or apparent agency "arises as a result of
conduct of the principal which causes the third party reasonably to believe that the
agent possesses the authority." Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 480 (quoting Tomerlin
v. Canadian Indem. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 638, 643, 394 P.2d 571, 574, 39 Cal. Rptr.
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disputes in cases holding that the issue of a contract's existence is
nonarbitrable generally center around whether there is an agreement
between the parties,'3 2 whether an unsigned agreement should nev-
ertheless bind a party,'33 whether an agreement binds a third party,' 4
and whether certain agents have authority to bind their principals.3 5
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Prima
Paint made a preliminary ruling that the contract existed;'36 thus,
making a preliminary determination that a contract exists is permis-
sible under Prima Paint. Even so, such a determination goes beyond
the express language of section 4 of the FAA.'3 7 Section 4 does not
specifically permit judicial determination of a contract's existence,
but limits the judiciary's role to making a preliminary inquiry into
whether a valid arbitration agreement has been made.'"
Standard Fruit mandates that once a contractual relationship is
established, and the court has determined that both sides have com-
mitted to arbitrate, all other questions are for the arbitrator."' Ac-
cordingly, once a court determines that the parties are bound by an
731, 734 (1964)). The court also noted that a party can be bound solely by subsequent
conduct whether agency existed or not. Id. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text for a description of SFC's conduct evidencing ratification and a binding agree-
ment.
132 I.S. Joseph Co., 803 F.2d at 400 (when one party denies the existence of a
contract with another, the issue is for the district court).
131 American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1968) (district court, not arbitrators, must determine whether an assignee of an
arbitration clause can enforce the arbitration agreement against one of the former
parties); McAllister Brothers, Inc. v. A & S Transp., 621 F.2d 519, 523-24 (2d Cir.
1980) (whether affiliates of a contracting party are bound by arbitration clause is
an issue for the court).
134 Heinhuis, No. CIV.A.90-2148, 1991 WL 111011 at *3 (holding no arbitration
as third party defendants had no contractual relationship with third party plaintiffs).
'I See, e.g., Three Valleys Mun. Water Distr. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d
1136, 1140-42 (9th Cir. 1991) (involving dispute over the issue of whether the signatory
was without authority to bind his principal, where the court held that the issue of
agency is essentially a legal one and must be decided by a court); Par-Knit Mills,
Inc. v. Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1980); N & D Fashions, Inc.
v. DHJ Indus., 548 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1976) (both holding that the question of
whether a particular individual has authority to bind a party must be determined
by the court, not by an arbitrator); but see Flender Corp. v. Techna-Quip Co., 953
F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992) (where an arbitration clause authorized parties to arbitrate
disputes as to "relationships created" under the contract, the issue of existence of
a contractual relationship was held arbitrable).
136 Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 476.
"1 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
13' See supra note 43, which sets out the relevant portion of 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
139 Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 475-76.
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arbitration provision, everything else goes to the validity of the con-
tract, and the arbitration provision is severable. Thus, in one fell
swoop the Ninth Circuit has managed to clear the traditional con-
fusion concerning "existence" and validity, and to reconcile Prima
Paint with a long line of seemingly conflicting cases.
B. Directives for Drafting with Respect to Arbitration
The Ninth Circuit's decision allows individuals to select their own
"decision" system for all issues, restricted only by judicial review of
whether the agreement to arbitrate is valid. Thus, whether a dispute
will be arbitrated or judicially determined has become a matter of
choice. It is therefore imperative that contracting parties planning to
include an arbitration clause in the contract fully understand that
clause's implications.
In Standard Fruit, the Ninth Circuit noted that the FAA is phrased
in mandatory terms and leaves no room for discretion. Parties will
be directed to arbitrate on issues as to which an arbitration agreement
has been made and signed.'40 Although arbitration agreements are to
be "rigorously enforce[d],"' ' 4' the policy behind this enforcement is
described as a "liberal" means of ensuring private contracting rights. 42
The Ninth Circuit indicates that intent of the parties is paramount,
noting that a court's primary concern is to effectuate the parties'
intentions, as in other contracting situations. 143 In observance of the
Supreme Court's presumption of arbitrability, the Ninth Circuit warns
"that the most minimal indication . . .of intent to arbitrate" will
be construed in favor of arbitration.'" This liberal construction in
favor of arbitration relates back to the FAA's underlying purpose
of ensuring that arbitration agreements receive guarantees of en-
forcement equal to all other private contracts. 45 Courts find the
140 Id. at 475; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985).
141 Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 475 (quoting Byrd, 470 U.S. at 221).
142 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 625 (1985) (describing the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements
and noting that in reality it is a policy guaranteeing enforcement of private contracts);
accord Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
,, Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 475; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
" Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 478; accord Bauhina Corp. v. China Nat'l Machinery
& Equip. Import & Export Corp., 819 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1987) (arbitration ordered
even though the contract contained two incomplete and contradictory arbitration
clauses); Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1462-
63 (9th Cir. 1983) (broadly construing scope of arbitration clause under the FAA).
" See H.R. REP. No. 96, supra note 39.
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intention to arbitrate in the arbitration clause. In accordance with
the emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitration, courts will interpret
the scope of the disputes covered by the clause liberally.'4 Finally,
courts will resolve any doubts concerning arbitrability in favor of
arbitration. 47 This principle applies whether the uncertainty involves
the construction of the language of the clause itself or a defense to
arbitrability. 4
Severability of the arbitration clause also turns upon the scope of
disputes covered by the arbitration clause. In Standard Fruit, the
Ninth Circuit determined that Prima Paint demands that all arbitra-
tion clauses will be severable unless clear intentions to the contrary
are evident. 49 Thus, unless the clause fails to cover the dispute in
issue, the arbitration clause will be severable and enforceable.
In Standard Fruit, the arbitration clause provided that "any and
all disputes arising under the arrangements contemplated hereunder"
would be referred to arbitration. 50 Accordingly, the court construed
the broad language in light of the Prima Paint severability rule and
the strong presumption favoring arbitration in international disputes,
and held that the breach of contract claim was arbitrable.' The
court found no evidence that the provision was intended to be non-
severable and concluded that strict enforcement of the arbitration
agreement was warranted.' 52
Standard Fruit provides a clear directive for drafting strategy. To
ensure that the arbitration clause will be severable from its container
I- Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Teledyne,
Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1989).
'41 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 460 U.S. at 24-25; see also French v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 784 F.2d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1986) (an
agreement susceptible of an interpretation allowing arbitration should be resolved
in favor of arbitration).
I"9 See supra note 80 for cases illustrating the difficulty of asserting a defense
capable of avoiding arbitration.
"I Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 476 (declaring that "the unmistakably clear con-
gressional purpose that the arbitration procedure . . . be speedy and not subject to
delay and obstruction in the courts") (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 at 404).
11o Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 473. See also supra note 16 for a discussion of
circumstances surrounding the drafting of the clause.
"' Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 480-81. The court held the clause would be enforced
against C & C and Steamship. SFC was not included, as the court remanded the
issue of SFC's agency and the existence of a contractual relationship to the district
court.
112 Id. at 477.
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contract, thereby allowing arbitration of all disputes except for the
validity of the arbitration clause itself, parties should draft a broad
arbitration clause. For example, a broad arbitration clause would
provide for the arbitration of "any and all disputes relating to or
arising under this contract.""' Ultimately, if a broad enough arbi-
tration clause is used, the only issue not arbitrable once the existence
of a contractual relationship is determined is the validity of the
arbitration clause itself.14
Conversely, if a party prefers judicial determination of certain
disputes, and only desires certain issues to be arbitrated, a narrow
arbitration clause with language expressly limiting arbitration to spe-
cific factual disputes must be used. If the clause is too limited to
include the dispute in issue, the requisite intent will be lacking and
arbitration will accordingly be denied.'55 Regardless of the parties'
desires as to the clause's scope, to be effective as well as consistent
with the intent of the parties the arbitration agreement should provide
for the applicable law to be used, the method of appointing arbi-
trators, the arbitrators' qualifications, and the place where the ar-
bitration will take place.5 6
Thus, the FAA allows arbitration where the parties desire it, but
is not so inflexible as to mandate arbitration where the parties express
contrary intent. Provided that a contract contains a broad arbitration
clause, and no allegations are made as to the making of the arbitration
clause itself, disputes will be sent to arbitration regardless of the
validity of the underlying contract.'1 Accordingly, arbitration has
become a matter of choice; as long as parties make their intentions
clear when drafting the arbitration clause, predictability is ensured.
C. Standard Fruit's Impact on International Trade
Although Standard Fruit plainly illustrates the new predictability
possible in contracting to arbitrate, the decision is even more sig-
'5 For examples of clauses held to be broad and narrow arbitration by the courts,
see supra notes 91-92.
'-4 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). See supra note 43, which sets out the relevant portion
of the section.
"I Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 477 (the issue of arbitrability "is to be determined
by the contract entered into by the parties.") (quoting Drake Bakeries v. Local 50,
Am. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l., 370 U.S. 254, 256 (1962)); accord
AT&T Technologies v. Communication Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648-49
(1986).
156 See Lord, supra note 109, at 227 (discussing the essential elements in drafting
an arbitration agreement).
," Parties must not dispute the existence of a contractual relationship, however.
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nificant in light of its potential impact on the international business
community. It is universally agreed that the "emphatic federal policy
in favor of arbitral dispute resolution applies with special force in
the field of international commerce." "8 When international companies
commit themselves to arbitrate, they are in reality attempting to secure
a forum for the resolution of disputes. Thus, the Ninth Circuit noted
that agreements to arbitrate warrant great deference as they operate
as both choice-of-forum and choice-of-law provisions, offering sta-
bility and predictability regardless of the vagaries of local law. 5 9
Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of this
guaranteed stability, declaring that "[tihe elimination of all such
uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both
parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce,
and contracting."160
The recent line of Supreme Court decisions regarding international
arbitration reflects a strong concern for the viability of international
commerce and a desire to establish a nonparochial judicial stance
towards arbitration.161 The Court observed that "[a] parochial refusal
.,*to enforce an international arbitration agreement . . . would
invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying . . . to secure
tactical litigation advantages.' 62 The "mutually destructive jockey-
ing" the Court warns of would in effect be a race between the parties
to find a forum. As a result, the action might be submitted to a
forum hostile to one of the parties' interests or unfamiliar with the
issue in dispute. 63 Underlying the pro-arbitration reasoning advanced
by the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit in Standard Fruit lies
a realization that the growth of international trade depends upon
contracting parties' ability to ensure neutrality and predictability when
,5 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404,
1410 (9th Cir. 1989).
159 Standard Fruit, 937 F.2d at 478.
'So Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518 (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13-14). The Court also
observed that an agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal was "in effect
a specialized kind of forum-selection clause, selecting not only the location for
dispute resolution, but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute." 417
U.S. at 519.
161 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at 519.
162 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516-17.
161 Id. at 519-20.
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resolving international disputes through judicial deference to the par-
ties' agreement.'"
This newfound ability to ensure neutrality and predictability in
international commercial arbitration will have an enormous impact
on the use of arbitration provisions, and in turn an even more
significant impact on the growth of international trade. As modern
nations maintain their day-to-day relations largely through commerce,
the most significant impact of international commercial arbitration
may be its contribution to world peace and stability.'65 Presently, it
is increased world trade, and not politics, that is making the largest
contribution to world peace, and that growth in trade is being ac-
complished through international arbitration.'"6
IV. CONCLUSION
Specific legislative enactments, international commitments, and broad
judicial pronouncements in the United States seem to mandate the
honoring of arbitration agreements in commercial contracts, partic-
ularly those that are international in scope. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the policy of holding parties to their arbitration agreements and, on
a broader scale, held that the arbitral process is capable of deciding
all issues save the validity of the arbitration agreement. However,
the Ninth Circuit has constricted recent expansive interpretations of
Prima Paint by insisting that before the arbitration clause is severable,
existence of a contractual relationship must first be established.
Although the Ninth Circuit has effectively drawn the long-awaited
line between the point where the existence of a contract ends and its
validity begins, it has gone beyond the express permission of the
FAA in doing so. Accordingly, it is crucial that future courts facing
similar issues be careful to leave that line where it is. Should the
courts begin pushing that line limiting determination of a contract's
existence too far in the direction of contract validity, such an im-
permissible stretch of the FAA's language could result in a gradual
reversal of the trend toward favoring liberal construction of arbitra-
16, Pietrowski, supra note 51, at 59-61.
'6 Michalle F. Hoellering, International Commercial Arbitration: A Peaceful Method
of Dispute Settlement, ARe. J., Dec. 1985, at 19, 19-20. The author also noted that
"[elven between countries with antagonistic policies, trade continues. International
commerce may not directly avoid all war, but it certainly creates interdependence
and balance."
I" Id. at 19.
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tion agreements. The unfortunate result could be judicial refusal to
permit arbitration of claims concerning a contract's validity.
Jennifer Bagwell
